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Edmund M.  Tavernier, Farong Li, and Tugrul T.  Temel
This paper uses  search  theory  to examine  the role that risk  preference  (RP) plays in farmland
preservation.  Assuming  that the distribution  of the offer price  is fixed,  the analysis  indicates
that risk-averse agents  have  lower  reservation prices  than risk-neutral  agents,  and  that
agricultural  land held by  the former exits  farming  at a faster rate.  The results alsb  show  that
farmland  preservation policies  which increase reservation  prices  have a greater  capitalization
effect  if agents  are risk-loving,  and that  such policies,  while effectively  protecting  the interest
of land  speculators,  may be less  effective  in serving  the needs  of farming  and farm-held  open
space.
Farmland preservation policies  can be found in all  argued that  in  some cases  the benefits  of the pol-
fifty states,  yet the role that the risk preferences of  icies  are  capitalized  into  farmland  prices:  Thus,
farmers  and other agents  play in preserving  farm-  these  prices  become  higher  than  they  would  be
land has  received very little attention  in the litera-  without  government  intervention.  This  increase
ture.  Understanding  that role  is essential to evalu-  can be  considered  the  capitalization  effect  of the
ating  the  effectiveness  of such  policies  and  may  policy (see  Fischel  for a review  of the capitaliza-
provide a basis for informed land-use decisions by  tion effects of zoning).
policy makers.  These  decisions  are generally  mo-  The magnitude of the two effects and the impli-
tivated by the need to provide  open space  (Rose),  cation they hold for farmland preservation policy is
environmental  amenities  (Kline  and  Wichelns),  not  clear  when  risk preferences  are  considered.
and  public goods  (Nelson),  and considerations  re-  Past research  on uncertainty  and  land  prices  pro-
garding  the production  of specialty  crops  (Berry;  vides little guidance because the focus as tended to
Sinclair).  The motivations  are supported in part by  be  on  the  importance  of  these  elements  in  land
the  belief  that  the  free  market  will  not  socially  price formation.  White  and  Zimmer  illustrate  the
optimize the allocation of land between open space  importance  of risk  as  a determinant  of  farm real
and  environmental  amenities and other uses,  such  estate  prices.  Harris  and  Nehring  develop  a theo-
as maintaining  sufficient  land for a viable  agricul-  retical  model  in  which they  demonstrate the  rela-
ture  (Gardner).  Hence  some  type  of government  tive  importance  of the  degree  of risk  aversion  in
action  is generally proposed to preserve farmland.  determining  bid-price  differentials  among  farm
The  instruments  of farmland  preservation  gen-  size classes.  Brown and Brown examine the effect
erally used by government range from property tax  of heterogeneous  expectations  on farmland  prices
relief policies to agricultural zoning and the acqui-  and conclude  that the speculative component built
sition of development rights (see Forkenbrock and  into  a seller's reservation  price  is  partly responsi-
Fisher;  Berry  and  Plaut;  Furuseth;  and  Nelson  ble for the rise  in farmland  prices.
1986 for further discussion  of the effectiveness  of  Though the  previous  studies  identify  the effec-
these policies in preserving farmland).  In all cases,  tiveness of certain policy instruments in preserving
the  policy instrument  has  a preservation  effect by  farmland  and  the  importance  of risk  and  uncer-
keeping land in agriculture  longer. It has also been  tainty  in land  price formation,  the  existing  litera-
ture  provides  no  theoretical  framework  that inte-
grates  farmland preservation  and risk preferences.
This  study  attempts  to construct  a theoretical  ap-
The authors are assistant professor, Department of Agricultural Econom-  T  s  extending  the framework developed  by
ics  and  Marketing,  Rutgers  University;  statistician  Johnson  and  proach by extending  the framework  developed  by
Johnson,  New Brunswick,  New Jersey; and postdoctoral  associate,  De-  Tavernier  and  Li  (1995).  We borrow  the search-
partment of Agricultural Economics and Marketing,  Rutgers University.  theoretic  approach from labor economics to exam-
The authors  wish to acknowledge  helpful  comments made by the anon-  ialiatin  and  r  rvatin  ffts 
ymous  journal  reviewers.  We are also  grateful  to Maurice  Hartley  forapitalization  an  preservation 
valuable suggestions.  farmland  preservation  policies  when  risk  prefer-Tavernier, Li, and Temel  Risk Preference and Farmland  Preservation  39
ences are considered.  The approach is more than a  edge,  however, search theory has not been applied
novel method for examining farmland  preservation  to the  farmland  market  where  sellers  engage  in  a
when  risk preference  is  present.  The results show  sequential  search  process.  Following Sargent,  we
that  risk preference  affects  current  farmland  pric-  develop  a simple  supply-side  model  to  illustrate
ing decisions and holds important  implications  for  the  formation of the  seller's  reservation  price  (or
future farmland preservation policy.  For example,  reservation wage in the case of job search theory),
in the  case  of  farmers  who  are  more  risk-averse  which  we  later use  to  analyze  the  impact  of risk
than  are  other  agents,  the  results  of  our  search  preference  on farmland  preservation.
model suggest  that  comparatively  more  land  will  Suppose a farmer owns a parcel of land L, where
end  up  in  the  hands  of  other  agents.  Under  the  L  =  1, the  normalized  unit  of land.  The  farmer
same  ordering  of  preferences,  the  results,  which  obtains  income,  I,  from the  land at time t. Hence
are consistent  with empirical  observations  in  land  a  risk  neutral  farmer  will  maximize  the  present
market  studies,  also  show  that  farmers  appear  to  discounted expected  income,
benefit  less  than  other  agents  from  government
policies that increase current farm income,  making 
the  land they  hold more  vulnerable  to conversion  (1)  v(q)  = E  1'l1
to other uses.  -t=
where v(q)  is the expected  value of [St  o 3t] for
Basic  Model  a farmer  who  has  offer price  q  in hand.  E  is the
expectation  operator,  and  (3 =  1/(1  +  r) is  the
The  basic  model  has  already  been  developed  by  discount  factor with discount rate  r. Suppose fur-
Tavernier and Li (1995).  It is useful to present the  ther that the farmer has the potential to sell the land
framework  again,  however, to focus on the under-  and  gets  an  offer  price,  q,  from  the  buyer.  This
lying relationships  that  are  relevant to  this  study.  means that  she  can obtain  income It from one  of
The  approach uses  search theory,  which has  been  two  sources,  farming  or  the  sale  of land.  If she
shown  to  be  useful  in  analyzing  the  market  for  sells the land at time t, she gets price, q, a one-time
heterogeneous  goods  (see  Lippman  and  McCall;  income,  and stops the search process (e.g., I,  = q
Kiyotaki and Wright).  at  time  t and  0  thereafter).  If she keeps  farming,
According  to  "job  search  theory,"  an  unem-  she receives farm income,  z, for this period (i.e., It
ployed individual looks for a job offer each period,  at time  t) and searches for another offer in the next
where  the job offer consists  of a stated wage rate.  period  t  +  1. The  variable  z  is  assumed  to  be
The  individual  knows  the  distribution  of  wage  exogenous  even  though  in  reality  it  might  be  af-
rates,  and each offer  is  an independent  draw from  fected  by government  agricultural policies  and lo-
that distribution. The idea  here is that the individ-  cal property  tax policies,  among others.  The deci-
ual  may  know  the  general  features  of  the  wage  sion problem to sell or not to sell can be thought of
distribution in a location but does not know which  as  weighing  the opportunity  costs associated  with
firm or unit of the  firm offers which wage (Devine  keeping  the land  in  its current farming  use  as op-
and  Kiefer).  For  landowners,  the  assumption  is  posed to the expected  gain from selling  for devel-
that an offer to purchase land is made by buyers in  opment.  If the  farmer decides  to search  for a new
the land market.  The number  or type of buyers  in  offer  price p,  then she  implicitly believes  that  the
the  land  market  or  how  much  buyers  would  be  present  value  of  the  land  sold at  a future  date  is
willing to pay for the land is not known. Hence the  more than the present value of the land sold today.
distribution of the offer price for the land market in  Define  the  future  offer  price of land  as  a non-
general is not known,  although specific  features of  negative  random  variable,  p,  with  a  cumulative
the offer distribution,  such  as soil type,  infrastruc-  probability  price  distribution  F(P), by  F(P)  =
ture,  range  of previous  offers,  and  so on  may  be  Prob{p < P}. We assume F(0) = 0 and F(oo) =  1,
known  for a particular  location.  Common  to both  where F is  a nondecreasing  function and  continu-
the  land  seller and  the job seeker  are  a degree  of  ous  function  from  the  right.  We  assume  further
uncertainty  characterized by imperfect information  that  F is  bounded  from  above  (i.e.,  there  is  an
in  both  markets  and  a  commitment  of  time  and  upper  bound B  <  o,  such  that  F(B)  =  1).  The
resources  devoted  to  the search  process.  farmer  does not observe  all p, but the  distribution
The  application  of search  theory  to  analyze  an  F(P) from  which the  future offer  price p at time t
unemployed worker's  optimal search  strategy in a  is  randomly drawn.  The farmer knows  the  distri-
nonsequential  framework  has  already  been exam-  bution  of  the  offer  price  for  land  in  an  area  or
ined  (Stigler;  McCall).  To the  best of our knowl-  region but does not know the specific price for any40  April 1996  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
tract of land.  So  the  relevant distribution  may be  The solution  to equation (5)  is unique.2 The left-
specific  to  tract  characteristics,  such  as  amenity  hand side of the equation  can be considered  as the
benefits  and  developmental  potential,  which  is  marginal cost of searching  one more period when
captured  in F and  might  itself be  the  result  of  a  an offer q is made.  The right-hand  side represents
search effort.  For now, we  assume that the distri-  the expected  benefit  from  searching,  in terms  of
bution,  F(P),  for  a  particular  parcel  of  land  is  the expected present value associated with drawing
given.'  p >  r. Equation  (5)  enables  the farmer to set the
The  sequential  nature  of  the  search  process  reservation  price such that the cost of searching in
makes dynamic programming a convenient method  one  more period equals  the marginal  benefit from
to model the decision-making process.  Without re-  waiting  and could be considered  the optimal  deci-
call,  Bellman's  functional  equation  can  be  ex-  sion rule of farmers in the farmland market.  Equa-
pressed  as  tion  (5)  is  also an implicit function of the reserva-
tion price.
(2)  v(q)  = max q,z  + 13  X  v(p)dF(p)l  To facilitate  the analysis,  let
where  the  maximization  is over  the  two  actions,  (6)  h(r)  = fr  F(p)dp.
(1)  accept the  offer q  this period,  or (2) reject the
offer q  and receive  z  this period  and draw  a  new  Then equation  (5)  becomes
offer price p from distribution of F(P) next period.
The value function  v(q) is  of the following  form,  (7)  r - z  = PEp +  fh(r).
{ · ,.  ·~Note that h(0)  = 0, h'(r) = F(r) > 0, and h"(r) =
q  if q~ r  F'(r) > 0.
v(q)
(3)  3  z+  t  v(p)dF(p) ifq <  r
Farmland Market and Preservation Policy
where  r is  the reservation  price  or the  minimum
offer  that  the  farmer  would  accept  for  the  land.  In this section  the search model is used to provide
Equation (3) says that if the offer price q is greater  insights  into the  underlying  relationships  between
than or equal to the reservation  price r, the farmer  the farmland  market and  preservation  policy.
will accept the offer q; otherwise she receives z and  Recall that the mix of  olicies  enerall  used to
continues  to  search  another  offer.  Here  it  is  as-  preserve  farmland  includes  property  tax  relief, preserve  farmland  includes  property  tax  relief, sumed that the  probability of getting an  offer next  right-to-farm  laws,  acquisition  of  development
period  is  one (see Sargent  for the search model  in  rights,  and agricultural  zoning.  Of these policies
which  this probability  is  not  one).  This  equation  property  tax  relief is perhaps  the most controver
can  be  converted  into  an  ordinary  equation  that  sial  for some argue  that it encourages  speculation
enables  us  to  solve  for  the  optimal  reservation  over  preservation  (Nelson  1990).  The  policy  re-
price.  At  this price there  is no difference  between  duces  the  taxes  farmers pay because  their land  is
accepting the offer, q,  and searching  for a p in the  assessed at its agricultural use instead of its market
next penriod.  .value  or development  potential.  This  practice  in-
More  formally,  evaluating v(r)  and using equa-  directly  increases  farm  income  and  has  implica-
tion (3),  we have  tions  for the  farmland  market and  farmland  pres-
C(4)  r—  - RP  F  vi  Ff)  ervation.
(4)  r  = Z +  3  vp)dTo see this  we apply the  implicit function theo-
rem to equation  (7)  and get
=  z +  p fo  rdF(p) +  p I  pdF(p) ~J~o  ~  ~  Jr  ~dr  1
(8)  >  0. which  is equivalent to  dz  1 - 3F(r)
(5)  r-z  =  Ep +  3  f  F(p)dp.  According  to  equation  (8),  increases  in farm  in-
P  -z  =  3E+  Jo  F(p)dp.  Jcome  lead  to  increases  in  the  reservation  price.
This  increase  in  the  reservation  price  is  in  part
related to the effect of the property  tax relief pol-
In another paper, Tavemier and Li (1994)  examine the formation of  icy,  which  increases  farm  income,  leading  to  a
F(P) in a game theoretic  framework.
2 For  proof  that  the  above problem  satisfies  Blackwell's  sufficient  capitalization  of the  policy  in  land  values.  This
condition  for a contract mapping,  see  Sargent.  finding  is supported  by Anderson  and Bunch.Tavernier, Li, and Temel  Risk Preference and Farmland  Presernation  41
The variable z may also  be seen as  an opportu-  suggests  that  any  increase  in r increases  T  and
nity cost of farming (not selling)  if it is negative.  delays the sale  of farmland and that for a given F,
Increases  in  the  opportunity  cost  or  decreases  in  the mean  waiting period before  land  is sold,  is  a
farm  income  decrease  the reservation  price.  This  monotonically  increasing  function  of the reserva-
decrease  may not  necessarily  result  in the  imme-  tion price,  r. This value can be used  as a measure
diate conversion of farmland,  because the reserva-  of the  impact of public policies  on farmland  pres-
tion price is also a function of the subjective belief  ervation. Notice,  however, that increases in z also
about the distribution of the future offer price; but,  increase  T.
according to our model,  a reservation  price lower  Using equations (8) and  (9),  we  have
than  the  offer  price  increases  the  chances  thatr)  dr
farmland will be sold at the current offer price, and  (10)  d  - fr))2  >  0,
conversely a reservation price higher than the offer  dz  dr  dz  (  - F(r  dz
price decreases  the chances  that  farmland  will  be  where  r)  is  the  probability  density  function  of
sold.  In our model,  it  is assumed that farmers  and  F(r). It is clear from equation (10)  that any policy
other  agents  have  the same  wealth  and the  same  that  increases  directly  (e.g.,  direct  production
subjective distribution of offer prices.  Further note  s  idies) or  indirectly  (property  tax-relief)  also
that the reservation  price itself is a function of the  su  ies)  or nd  hs a  preserty  taelief  )  ao
subjective belief about the distribution of the offer  ncreases  T and  has a preservation  effect 
and  should  be considered  in farmland  conversion  The  above  results  are  consistent  with  cases
and  should  be  considered  in farmland  conversion  where farmers  operate their farms at a loss (z < 0)
issues. The case in which farmers and other agents  within the relevant range instead  of selling  below
have  different  subjective distributions  of the offer  the  reservation  price  The  preservation  effect
price can be analyzed by the inclusion of the theory  frm frmig  till  r  i  posive  T> 0.  How-
of asymmetric  information in our framework (Ak-  from  farming  still remains  positive  T > O  How
of asymmetric  information  in our framework (Ak-  ever, the magnitude of the final preservation effect
erlof).  However,  we  are  solely  interested  in  the  is not  uite clear because of the influence  of F(r) in
difference between  the risk preferences of farmers.  Ts teorecal  inng m  e
and  other agents for  a given  level of risk.  equation  (10).  This  theoretical  finding  may  help
and other agents for a given level of risk.  ^  ^  ^ai analyses  of the  effective-
The decision to accept  or not to accept  the cur-  explain  why  empirical  analyses  of the  effective
rent offer price is based on the farmer's reservation  ness  of  property  tax  relief policies  in  preserving
price  and  influences  the  length  of time  land  re-  famld  b  e  ue  t  t  ission of a variable or vai-
mains  in  farming.  Following  our  definition  of  could be due to the omission of a variable or vari-
mains  in  farming.  Following  our  definition  of  ables  measuring  the  impact  of government  inter-
F( · ),  let  F(r) be  the  probability  of offer  prices  ve  ntion  on the demand  side  of  the  farmland  mar-
lower than reservation  prices,  i.e., F(r) = Prob{q 
r  r}.  The  search  model  suggests  that  the  farmer  ket.
rejects such  offer prices with probability F(r) and  The results  derived above  are based  on  the  as-
srejects  forsuch  offter  p  ces  w  ith  probility F(r) and  sumption that  the distribution of offer prices  does
searches for another offer price in the next period.  not change in response to government intervention not change  in response to government  intervention
Thus,  the  probability  that  the  farmer  accepts  an  in  the  farmland  market.  This assumption  is qs-
offer in  period n  is (1-F(r))(F(r))n-  ,  which  fol-  ton  ,  if  far  ar  e  rational  agents,  we tionable,  for  if farmers  are  rational  agents,  we
lows a geometric distribution from which the pres-  would expect  them to  incorporate  all relevant  in-
ervation effect  formation  affecting land transactions into their de-
1  cision making  processes.  Hence,  considering  that
(9)  T  1 -F(r  property  tax  relief  policies  increase  reservation
prices,  farmers  may  be inclined to set  higher res-
can  be  calculated.  The  variable  T  equals  the  ervation  prices,  which would  increase the  capital-
amount of time that land remains in farming before  ization effect  of property  tax relief policies.
it is sold and is the reciprocal  of the probability  of
accepting  the  offer on a single trial.  Equation  (9)
Uncertainty  and Risk Aversion
3 Note  that the  probability  that a seller  will find a buyer  for his land  In  the  previous  section  we showed  that  farmland
in a given period is the probability  of receiving  an acceptable offer. This  preservation  policy and, in particular,  property tax
probability  equals  the  product  of (a)  the  offer probability,  and  (b)  the
probability that a random offer drawn  from the  distribution of the  offer  relief policies  had two possible  effects on  agricul-
price will be  above  the seller's  reservation  price.  In the simple  frame-  tural  land.  First,  we  showed  that  the  policy  in-
work used  here,  these  factors  are  constant,  so  that  the  probability  of
selling land is itself constant. Hence  the probability that land will remain
in farming  for one period, two periods, etc.,  can be calculated from the
geometric  distribution. See Devine and Kiefer for the argument from the  4  Such behavior can be considered rational if farmers anticipate higher
point of view  of an unemployed  worker,  future  offers.42  April 1996  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
duced an increase  in the reservation  price, which  that increases  in the reservation  price could be the
we called a capitalization effect.  Second,  we dem-  result  of increased volatility  in the buyer's market
onstrated that increases  in the reservation price de-  or an  increase  in the  mean of the  offer price,  an
lay the  sale of land  and lead to  a preservation  ef-  observation consistent with the findings of Titman
fect.  We now examine the effect of uncertainty and  and  of  Ellson  and  Roberts.  The  implication  for
risk on the capitalization and preservation  of farm-  farmland  preservation  and  the  capitalization  of
land.  farmland  has already  been noted.
It is a commonly  held position  that individuals  We have up to this point shown how uncertainty
are  not indifferent  to  uncertainty  and  will  not,  in  affects the reservation price of land owners. Earlier
general,  value assets with uncertain returns  at their  we illustrated  the capitalization effects  and the de-
expected values  (see Arrow and Lind for a greater  lay  in the  sale of land  when farm income  was in-
exposition of this argument).  In what follows,  un-  creased. These insights were based on the assump-
certainty is modeled as the distribution of the offer  tion  that  farmers  were  risk-neutral.  Though  this
price, because  farmers do not observe  the true of-  assumption  simplifies  the  model,  it  does  not  ex-
fer price.  For simplicity we continue  with the risk  plain  the  risk-averse  behavior  of many  agents  in
neutrality assumption before demonstrating the im-  the  economic  world,  a serious  omission  of farm-
pact of different risk attitudes  on farmland preser-  land preservation  studies (Brown and Brown). We
vation.  now  examine the  implication for farmland preser-
Recent  theoretical  studies  show  that  land-use  vation  policy  when  risk aversion  is  incorporated
control programs  may cause an increase  in the de-  into  the  analysis.
mand  for  land  because  they  reduce  uncertainty  Assume that farmers  behave  as  expected utility
(Titman;  Shilling,  Sirmans  and  Guidry).  Beaton  maximizers following the axioms of rationality es-
and Henneberry and Barrows have also established  tablished  by von Neumann  and Morgenstern.  Fur-
that  government  land preservation  policies  affect  ther,  assume that their expected utility function, u,
the  degree of uncertainty  in  the  farmland  market.  is C2. Then equation  (5)  becomes
Hence,  past studies suggest that uncertainty plays a
role  in  land  price  formation,  and  risk preference  (11)  r
affects  land  allocation  decisions.  Therefore,  the  u(r)-  u(z)  =  3E[u(p)]  +  3 j  F(p)d[u(p)].
capitalization  and preservation  effects of farmland
preservation  implied  by the search  model suggest  To  examine  how  the  farmer's  attitude  toward
that land price formation under different risk pref-  risk  affects  the  reservation  price  and  the  subse-
erences  would  affect  land  conversion  and  subse-  quent implication of risk preferences for farmland
quent preservation  efforts  differently.  preservation,  we  develop  the  following  proposi-
We have  already established  that  if farmers  do  tion.5
not sell their land  in the current  period,  then they  PROPOSITION  2:  A  risk-averse (loving) farmer
wait  to  draw  another  p  from  the  distribution  of  has a lower (higher) reservation  price than a risk-
F(P) in the next period,  having observed  only the  neutralfarmer.
distribution of the offer price and not the true offer  PROOF:  Suppose the farmer is risk-averse; then u
price.  Rothschild and Stiglitz show that an increase  is a concave function.  Because u is C2,  - 1( ) will
in h(r) (in equation  [7])  without  a corresponding  be a convex function.  Using  the definition of con-
increase  in  Ep  results  in  a  mean-preserving  in-  vexity and concavity and the Jensen inequality, we
crease  in spread. To understand the implication for  have
the  reservation  price,  we formulate  the  following
proposition. 
PROPOSITION  1:  An increase in the mean of the  ra = u-  u(z)  + f3E[u(p)]  + 13  F(p)d[u(p)]
offer price and mean-preserving spread results in  o
an increase in the reservation  price.
PROOF:  Recall  that h(O)  = 0, h'(r) = F(r) > 0,  - -'(u(z))  + u- 1(~E[u(p)])
and  h"(r) = F'(r)  >  0, which  implies that h(r) is
a convex function.  Thus,  holding all other param-
eters  in  equation  (7)  constant  and  increasing  the 
mean of the offer price, Ep, will shift the curve (Ep  Because  farm  income  plays an important  role  in reservation  price ,,mean  of the offer price, Ep, will shift the curve (E  increase,  we assume that  the farm income of farmers and speculators  is
+  h(r)) upward  for all r.  The  intersection of the  the  same  in  order  to  simplify  the  analysis.  This assumptin  does  not
curves,  (r - z)/3  and  (Ep  +  h(r)), will  result  in  dramatically change the result because  some farmers may themselves be
higher  r  This  graphical  sketch  f  equspeculation  (7)  ors. Moreover, in  the case of property tax relief policies, certain higher  r.  This  grapnical  sKetcn  of  equation  (7)  minimum income  standards  have to  be met to qualify  for  the program,
proves  Proposition  1.  This  proposition  suggests  which could be used as  the  benchmark  for  farm income.Tavernier, Li,  and Temel  Risk Preference and Farmland  Preservation  43
u-l( fr Fp  p)  PROOF:  Using  the  implicit  relationship  derived f+  u  (,3 J  F(p)d[u(p)])  from equation  (8)  (i.e.,  drldz > 0) and equation
(11),  we have
7
z  + u-'(u(3Ep))  ar  u'  (z)  1
(12)  —  =  —
+ ul (u(  o  F(p)dp))(12)  az  u' (r)  I-  3F(r)'
+  U - 1 (U(3 for F(p)dp))
Since r > z,  we have,  u(z)  > u'(r), u'(z)  = u'(r),
and  u'(z) < u'(r) for risk-averse,  risk-neutral,  and
-z  +  3Ep  +  3 f r F(p)dp = r  risk-loving  owners,  respectively.
~~~~Jo  ~We  have  already  shown  that  policies  that  in-
whe  an  ' ae r  n  p  s u  r rk  crease  farm  income  also  increase  the  reservation where ra and r" are reservation  prices under risk- price.  Proposition  3  suggests  that the increase  in averse  and risk-neutral  assumptions,  respectively.  i.  ii 
Thes  risk-loving  case  can  be  proven  in  a  similar  the  reservation  price  is greater if land  owners are The  risk-loving  case  can  be  proven  in  a  similar  -i 
manner.nrisk-loving.  If  we  assume  that  other  agents  are manner.
Even without  imposing  additional  structure,  the  risk-loving  or less  risk-averse  than  farmers,  then Even without  imposing additional  structure, the 
Proposition  3  suggests  that  at the  urban  fringes, model provides important insights about the ability  Proposition  3  suggests  that  at  the  urban fringes
J.P~~~~~ ,  ^  J  -. 0  iwhen  Propositions  2  and  3  are  considered,  farm-
of risk preferences to influence land-use decisions.  en  rpstions 2  nd  e  nsideed  farm land preservation policies designed to help farmers Recall that the reservation price is a major factor in  ld  n  ic 
determining  whether  land  is  converted  to  other  keep  land  in agriculture  may be disproportionately determining  whether  land  is  converted  to  other  i  r  i  i helping  speculators.  Further,  under  the  risk- uses.  Increases  in the reservation price help to de-  h  . ,  u  t 
lay the  sale of far  d.6 i  t  a  f  neutrality assumption from which equation (9) was lay the sale of farmland.  Hence in the absence of  . .
lan t  esaeoran  c  a crucial  implication  developed,  although  it is true  that  as  the reserva- farmland preservation policy, a crucial implication .farmland  preservation  policy,  acrucial  implition  tion  price  increases,  land  remains  in  agriculture
of Proposition  2  is that  at  the  same  level of risk,  i  a  r
iya risk-aversJe  farmer  exits  farming  longer,  under the assumption that farmers are more land held  by a  risk-averse  farmer  exits  farming Jsethnland  held  by  a  risk-nesf  reutsa  farmer  be  i  nrisk-averse  than  other  agents,  and  by  implication faster than land held by a risk-neutral  farmer be- faster than  land held  by  a risk-neutral  farmer  be-  have  lower reservation  prices,  land  in agricultural cause  of the  lower reservation  price.  Put  another  p  e  f  a  a  production  exits farming at a faster rate with pres- way,  the  degree  of  risk aversion  is  important  in  ervation policies and without reservation policies.
determining  the  extent to  which  land is preserved  ence  it  s  a  whe  risk  preerenes  a J  .i?  Hence,  it appears  that  when  risk  preferences  are and capitalized,  because of the impact of risk pref-  i  f  i  considered,  farmland preservation  policy, such  as erences  on  the  reservation  price.  Therefore  if we  use-value  assessment  that  increases  current  farm
assume  that  real  estate  speculators  are  less  risk-
assume  thatc  real este  income,  while effectively  protecting the interest of averse  than  farmers,  then  Proposition  2  suggests  ino  ,  le effectivey  pr  ing the interest 
that  because  the  reservation  price  of  farmers  is  other agents,  is less effective  in serving the needs that  because  the  reservation  price  of  farmers  is  o  i of farming  and  farm-held open space. lower  than that  of speculators,  more  land will  in-
creasingly  be held by  speculators,  a condition  ob-
served by  Brown  and Brown.
Earlier we showed that increases in farm income  Summary and Conclusion
increase  the reservation  price,  a capitalization  ef-
fect,  and that increases  in the reservation price de-  We used  a search-theoretic  approach to extend the
lay the sale of land, a preservation effect.  Suppose  literature  on  farmland  preservation  by incorporat-
that  the  increase  in  farm  income  is  the  result  of  ing  risk  preference  into  the  analysis  through  its
government  farmland  preservation  policy.  Propo-  impact o  the reservation price of land owners  We
sition  3 posits the  impact of such a policy on res-  developed  a framework  to  show how  risk  prefer-
ervation prices  when risk preferences  are  consid-  ence  influences  land-use  decisions  in the  absence
ered.  and presence of government farmland preservation
PROPOSITION  3:  Whenfaced with the same gov-  policy. We further analyzed the impact of risk neu-
ernment policy,  which increases current  farm in-  trality,  risk  aversion,  and  risk-loving  preferences
come, the reservation  price increases  less (more) if  on the preservation  price  of farmers.  Implications
the farmner is risk-averse (loving) than if he is risk-  for farmland preservation  policy were explored.
neutral.  The analysis suggests that when risk preferences
are considered,  a government policy that increases
6 This statement implies that dT/dr >  O.  From equation (10),  dTdz >  s We recognize that in  the case of a farmer  speculator the  land would
0.  We know  that drldz > 0 (equation  [8]),  therefore dTIdr >  0.  simply be under different ownership.  However, our operating hypothesis
7 Notice  that pF(r) # 1. Therefore  I  - -,tril  is also greater  than  1.  is  that acceptance  of an  offer means  that the land leaves  farming.44  April 1996  Agricultural  and Resource Economics Review
farm  income favors landowners  who  are less risk-  and Farmland Prices."  American Journal of Agricultural
averse.  If  we  grant  that  farmers  are  more  risk-  Economics 66(1984):164-69.
averse than are other agents,  an  implication of the  Devine,  T.J.,  and N.M.  Kiefer.  "The Empirical  Status  of Job
relationship  between  risk preference  and  govern-  Search  Theory."  Labour Economics 1(1993):3-24.
ment farmland  preservation  policy is that agricul-  Ellson,  R.,  and B.  Roberts.  "Residential  Land Development
Under  Uncertainty."  Journal of  Regional Science
tural  land held by  farmers  in a  preservation  pro-  23(  983Un30922.
gram exits farming at a faster rate than that held by  Ferguson  J.T.  valuation  of the Effectiveness  of Use-value
other agents.  Or put another way,  when risk pref-  Programs."  Property Tax Journal  7(1988):157-65.
erences  are considered,  farmland  preservation po-  Fischel, William  A.  "Introduction:  Four Maxims  for Research
icy  appears  to protect  the interest  of other agents  on  Land-use  Controls."  Land Economics 66(1990):230-
more  effectively than that of farmers.  35.
The model  could  be extended  so that  we  have  Forkenbrock,  David J.,  and Peter S. Fisher. "Tax Incentives to
different reservation prices  in each period.  An im-  Slow  Farmland  Conversion."  Policy Studies Journal
plication of this approach  is that,  following Prop-  11(1983):25-37.
osition 2, the optimal search policy would be char-  Furuseth,  Owen  J.  "The  Oregon  Agricultural Protection  Pro-
acterized  by  one  sequence  of  reservation  prices  gram:  A  Review  and  Assessment."  Natural Resource
(not just one price) for  farmers  and one  for other  Journal  21(1983):57-70.
agents.  Further,  we have concentrated on the fixed  Gardner,  Delworth  B.  "The  Economics  of Agricultural  Land agents.  Further, we have concentrated  on the fixed  "  J  g Preservation.'  American Journal  of  Agricultural  Econom-
offer probability  and  the acceptance decision.  The  ics 59(1977):1027-36.
focus  could  also  shift to the  determinants of the  59(1977):1027-36. focus  could  also  shift to  the  determinants  of the  Harris,  Duane  G., and  Richard F.  Nehring.  "Impact of Farm
offer  price  and,  for example,  investigate  how the  Size  on  the  Bidding  Potential  for  Agricultural  Land."
number and types of buyers in the farmland market  American Journal of Agricultural Economics 58(1976):
affect the distribution of the offer price or concen-  161-69.
trate on search  intensity, which would endogenize  Henneberry,  D.M.,  and R.L.  Barrows.  "Capitalization of Ex-
the offer distribution.  The  whole  analysis  in  this  clusive  Agricultural Zoning  into Farmland  Prices." Land
paper is based on the assumption that farmers  and  Economics 66(1990):249-58.
other agents  have the same income  and subjective  Kline, J., and D. Wichelns.  "Using Referendum Data to Char-
distribution of offer prices. This assumption can be  acteize  Public  Support  for  Purchasing  Development
relaxed  to  examine  the  role of  asymmetric  infor-  Rights  to Farmland."  Land Economics 70(1994):233-33.
mation  in  the  determination  of reservation  price.  Kiyotaki,  N.,  and  R. Wright.  "A  Search-Theoretic  Approach mation  in the  determination  of reservation  price.
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